File Upload Sanitization, Polyglot Prevention, Zip Bomb Defenses and Parser Hardening Across 54 Formats: Questions and Answers

Engineering reference answering 100 distinct technical questions on defending file upload endpoints against polyglot files, decompression bombs, XXE, SSRF, path traversal, and parser memory exhaustion across all 54 formats across all 54 file formats supported by SampleTestFiles.

Representative format hubs and diagnostic tools

Part 1: Document, spreadsheet and text format questions

1. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .avro (Avro) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (4F 62 6A 01) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in fastavro, validate MIME type (application/avro), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
2. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .bin (BIN) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (None) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python memoryview/bytes, validate Structure (None), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
3. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .bmp (BMP) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (42 4D) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in SDL2, validate Compression (Usually none), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
4. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .css (CSS) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and browser CSSOM parsers, validate Comments (/* */), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
5. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .csv (CSV) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python csv and Pandas read_csv, validate Types (None: every value is text until the reader interprets it), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
6. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .docx (DOCX) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Apache POI XWPF, validate Extension (.docx), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
7. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .eml (EML) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Apache James Mime4j, validate MIME type (message/rfc822), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
8. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .epub (EPUB) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Calibre, validate Standard (W3C EPUB 3.3), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
9. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .flac (FLAC) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (66 4C 61 43) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Audacity, validate Also seen as (audio/x-flac), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
10. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .geojson (GeoJSON) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Leaflet, validate Reference system (WGS 84), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
11. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .gif (GIF) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (47 49 46 38 39 61) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and browser <img> renderers, validate Transparency (One fully transparent palette entry; no partial alpha), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
12. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .gltf (glTF) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Blender, validate Extension (.gltf), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
13. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .gpx (GPX) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in QGIS, validate Elevation and time (Metres; UTC in ISO 8601), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
14. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .gz (GZ) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (1F 8B 08) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and browser DecompressionStream('gzip'), validate Extension (.gz), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
15. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .html (HTML) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (3C 21 44 4F 43 54 59 50 45) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Gecko, validate Extensions (.html and .htm), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
16. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .ico (ICO) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (00 00 01 00) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Pillow, validate Also seen as (image/x-icon), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
17. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .ics (iCalendar) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Apple Calendar, validate Time (UTC, floating, or with a time-zone identifier), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
18. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .ini (INI) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Windows GetPrivateProfileString, validate Extension (.ini), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
19. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .jpg (JPG) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (FF D8 FF) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Pillow, validate MIME type (image/jpeg), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
20. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .js (JavaScript) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Babel parser, validate Extension (.js), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
21. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .json (JSON) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in serde_json (Rust), validate Encoding (UTF-8 for interchange), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
22. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .jsonl (JSONL) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Fluent Bit, validate MIME type (application/jsonl), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
23. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .kml (KML) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in OpenLayers, validate Reference system (WGS 84), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
24. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .log (LOG) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Logstash, validate Extension (.log), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
25. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .m4a (M4A) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (66 74 79 70 4D 34 41 20 at byte offset 4) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in FFmpeg, validate Usual codec (AAC-LC (ISO/IEC 14496-3); sometimes ALAC), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.

Part 2: Image, audio, video, archive and 3D format questions

1. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .md (Markdown) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in marked, validate Specification (CommonMark; GitHub Flavored Markdown adds extensions), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
2. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .mkv (MKV) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (1A 45 DF A3) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in VLC, validate Related extensions (.mka audio, .mks subtitles, .webm), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
3. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .mov (MOV) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (66 74 79 70 71 74 20 20 at byte offset 4) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Apple QuickTime / AVFoundation, validate Common codecs (H.264, HEVC and ProRes video; AAC and PCM audio), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
4. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .mp3 (MP3) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (49 44 33) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and browser Web Audio / <audio>, validate Metadata (ID3v1 and ID3v2 tags), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
5. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .mp4 (MP4) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (66 74 79 70 at byte offset 4) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in FFmpeg/ffprobe, validate Extension (.mp4), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
6. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .obj (OBJ) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Blender, validate MIME type (model/obj), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
7. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .ods (ODS) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in LibreOffice Calc, validate Standard (OASIS OpenDocument 1.3; ISO/IEC 26300), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
8. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .odt (ODT) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Pandoc, validate Container (ZIP, with an uncompressed &quot;mimetype&quot; entry first), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
9. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .pdf (PDF) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (25 50 44 46 2D) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in qpdf, validate Compression (Optional per stream (Flate, DCT, JBIG2 and others)), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
10. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .png (PNG) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and browser Canvas/Image decoders, validate Transparency (Full alpha channel), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
11. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .pptx (PPTX) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in python-pptx, validate Extension (.pptx), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
12. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .rtf (RTF) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (7B 5C 72 74 66 31) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in unrtf, validate Also seen as (text/rtf), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
13. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .sql (SQL) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in mysql CLI, validate Standard (ISO/IEC 9075), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
14. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .srt (SRT) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and YouTube/Vimeo caption uploaders, validate Timestamp (HH:MM:SS,mmm with a comma before milliseconds), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
15. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .stl (STL) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (73 6F 6C 69 64) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in MeshLab, validate Binary layout (80-byte header, 4-byte count, 50 bytes per triangle), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
16. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .svg (SVG) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (3C 73 76 67) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and CairoSVG, validate Can contain (Shapes, text, gradients, filters, scripts, external references), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
17. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .tar (TAR) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (75 73 74 61 72 at byte offset 257) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python tarfile, validate Extension (.tar), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
18. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .tiff (TIFF) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (49 49 2A 00) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Pillow, validate MIME type (image/tiff), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
19. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .toml (TOML) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python tomllib (3.11+), validate Specification (TOML 1.0.0), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
20. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .tsv (TSV) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python csv(delimiter='\t'), validate Delimiter (Tab (U+0009)), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
21. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .txt (TXT) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (None) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Node.js fs.createReadStream, validate Byte order mark (Optional in UTF-8 (EF BB BF) and best avoided), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
22. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .vtt (WebVTT) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (57 45 42 56 54 54) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in hls.js, validate Encoding (UTF-8 only), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
23. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .wav (WAV) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (52 49 46 46 ?? ?? ?? ?? 57 41 56 45) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python wave/scipy.io.wavfile, validate Header (44 bytes in the canonical form), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
24. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .webm (WebM) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (1A 45 DF A3) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in and browser HTML5 <video>/MediaSource, validate MIME type (video/webm), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
25. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .webp (WebP) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (52 49 46 46 ?? ?? ?? ?? 57 45 42 50) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Sharp, validate Specification (RFC 9649 and the WebP container specification), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
26. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .xlsx (XLSX) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Pandas read_excel, validate Container (ZIP (Open Packaging Conventions)), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
27. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .xml (XML) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (3C 3F 78 6D 6C) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in libxml2, validate Standard (W3C XML 1.0), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
28. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .yaml (YAML) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (UTF-8 text) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Go gopkg.in/yaml.v3, validate Features (Anchors, aliases, tags, multiple documents per file), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
29. What security sanitization and parser resource limits should be enforced when processing untrusted .zip (ZIP) uploads?
Verify the magic signature (50 4B 03 04) at byte 0, enforce strict memory and decompression timeouts in Python zipfile, validate Directory (At the end of the file), and serve downloads with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.

Part 3: Architecture, implementation and pipeline questions

1. How do you prevent a crafted .avro file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run fastavro inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 757-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
2. How do you prevent a crafted .bin file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Python memoryview/bytes inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 1-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
3. How do you prevent a crafted .bmp file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run SDL2 inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 58-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
4. How do you prevent a crafted .css file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run and browser CSSOM parsers inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 220-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
5. How do you prevent a crafted .csv file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Python csv and Pandas read_csv inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 201-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
6. How do you prevent a crafted .docx file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Apache POI XWPF inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 37,888-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
7. How do you prevent a crafted .eml file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Apache James Mime4j inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 420-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
8. How do you prevent a crafted .epub file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Calibre inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 3,072-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
9. How do you prevent a crafted .flac file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Audacity inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 185-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
10. How do you prevent a crafted .geojson file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Leaflet inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 120-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
11. How do you prevent a crafted .gif file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run and browser <img> renderers inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 874-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
12. How do you prevent a crafted .gltf file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Blender inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 1,024-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
13. How do you prevent a crafted .gpx file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run QGIS inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 700-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
14. How do you prevent a crafted .gz file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run and browser DecompressionStream('gzip') inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 35-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
15. How do you prevent a crafted .html file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Gecko inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 700-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
16. How do you prevent a crafted .ico file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Pillow inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 1,024-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
17. How do you prevent a crafted .ics file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Apple Calendar inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 220-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
18. How do you prevent a crafted .ini file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Windows GetPrivateProfileString inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 120-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
19. How do you prevent a crafted .jpg file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Pillow inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 632-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
20. How do you prevent a crafted .js file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Babel parser inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 700-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
21. How do you prevent a crafted .json file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run serde_json (Rust) inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 136-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
22. How do you prevent a crafted .jsonl file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run Fluent Bit inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 37-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.
23. How do you prevent a crafted .kml file from triggering a denial-of-service (DoS) in backend worker processes?
Run OpenLayers inside a memory-capped sandbox, verify the minimum 400-byte header, and reject malformed streams early.

Part 4: Verification, edge cases and automation questions

1. Why should uploaded .avro files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .avro files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
2. Why should uploaded .bin files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .bin files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
3. Why should uploaded .bmp files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .bmp files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
4. Why should uploaded .css files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .css files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
5. Why should uploaded .csv files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .csv files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
6. Why should uploaded .docx files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .docx files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
7. Why should uploaded .eml files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .eml files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
8. Why should uploaded .epub files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .epub files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
9. Why should uploaded .flac files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .flac files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
10. Why should uploaded .geojson files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .geojson files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
11. Why should uploaded .gif files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .gif files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
12. Why should uploaded .gltf files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .gltf files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
13. Why should uploaded .gpx files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .gpx files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
14. Why should uploaded .gz files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .gz files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
15. Why should uploaded .html files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .html files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
16. Why should uploaded .ico files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .ico files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
17. Why should uploaded .ics files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .ics files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
18. Why should uploaded .ini files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .ini files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
19. Why should uploaded .jpg files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .jpg files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
20. Why should uploaded .js files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .js files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
21. Why should uploaded .json files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .json files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
22. Why should uploaded .jsonl files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .jsonl files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.
23. Why should uploaded .kml files never be served from the main application origin without a sandbox CSP header?
Serving user-supplied .kml files from a separate cookieless domain or with Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox prevents any active content or polyglot payload from accessing session cookies.

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